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This paper proposes a modied version of the standard search and
matching model of the labour market that includes a shirking mechanism.
We show that our model delivers a close match to the simulated volatilities,
correlations and autocorrelations of unemployment, vacancies, labour market
tightness and the job nding rate with values observed in US data. In
doing so, it outperforms prominent alternative models. Our model also
has novel policy implications for the impact of income taxes, subsidies on
hiring and employment taxes on unemployment and its volatility.
Keywords: search frictions, shirking, unemployment volatilty puzzle
JEL Classication: E23, E32, J23, J30, J64
1 Introduction
Although the currently dominant approach to modelling labour markets, the
search frictions model pioneered by, among others, Diamond (1982), Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000), provides a simple framework for
the analysis of the labour market and associated policy issues, it has some
well-known diculties. In the most prominent statement of these diculties,
Shimer (2005) compares the volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations of
unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job nding rate from
a calibrated and simulated version of the search frictions model with US data
for 1951-2003. Two ndings stand out. The simulated volatilities of these key
labour market variables are much lower than those observed in the data. And
the model cannot match the autocorrelation of vacancies or the co-movements
of vacancies with other labour market variables. The inability of the search
frictions model to match the cyclical behaviour of labour market variables, the
unemployment volatility puzzle, has been extensively analysed by a large and
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growing literature (e.g. Hall, 2005, Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Hagedorn and
Manovskii, 2008, Gertler and Trigari, 2009, Pissarides, 2009, Rogerson and
Shimer, 2010, Christiano et al, 2016 and Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2017). The
particular weakness of the search frictions model in explaining vacancies has
received less attention.
This paper argues that these weaknesses can be addressed by a modied
version of the search frictions model that incorporates a shirking mechanism.
Shirking arises because rms have imperfect information about the eort exerted
by workers; we model this by assuming rms have an exogenous probability
of detecting and ring a shirking worker. This implies that workers must
balance the utility benets of shirking against the costs, in the form of a higher
probability of becoming unemployed. In our baseline model, we follow the
extensive literature on shirking originated by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and
assume that wages are posted by rms. Firms will set the wage at the lowest
value that induces the worker to choose not to shirk; the no-shirking constraint.
Calibrating and simulating this model using, where possible, standard values
from the literature, we can closely match the volatilities of unemployment,
vacancies and labour market tightness and can also match the autocorrelation of
vacancies and the correlations between vacancies and the other variables. Our
calibration assumes a small shirking eect as the utility benet of shirking is
small and the probability of detection is high. This small friction is sucient to
generate a large volatility of unemployment and other labour market variables.
The model generates a large unemployment volatility through a mechanism
similar to that outlined by Hall (2005). Firms respond to a positive productivity
shock by posting more vacancies, leading to a fall in unemployment and an
increase in labour market tightness. In the standard search frictions model,
as Shimer (2005) argued, a highly pro-cyclical wage will absorb part of an
increase in productivity, reducing the incentive for rms to post vacancies and so
dampening cyclical movements in unemployment and vacancies. This does not
occur in our model since the wage oered by rms to workers has a low volatility
across the business cycle. We can also use the concept of the "fundamental
surplus", introduced by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017), to explore the underlying
forces that enable our model to generate a large unemployment volatility. We
argue that the fundamental surplus is lower when workers are able to shirk,
since rms must pay a wage premium to deter them from doing so. A smaller
fundmental surplus implies that the "invisible hand" can allocate fewer resources
to vacancy creation, leading, as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) argue, to a larger
volatility of unemployment.
Our ndings are robust to extending our simple baseline model. In section
4), we analyse the case where wages are set through worker-rm bargaining,
rather than through wage posting by rms, focusing on the credible bargaining
approach of Hall and Milgrom (2008). We show that this version of the model
also generates a large volatility of unemployment, since the bargained wage has
a low volatility across the business cycle. We also consider the impact of three
policy measures: income taxes paid by workers, hiring subsidies paid to rms
and payroll taxes. We show that our main results also hold in these extensions
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of our model.
We also show that our model has novel implications for policy. The literature
on labour market policy using the standard search frictions model (eg Pissarides,
2000) argues that the marginal tax rate on income has no direct impact on the
cyclicality of wages and unemployment. We show that this is not the case in
our model, as an increased marginal rate of income tax increases the volatility
of wages and reduces the volatility of unemployment. We also show that an
increased hiring subsidy or a payroll tax cut leads to reduced and less volatile
unemployment.
There is a robust body of evidence supporting the existence of shirking
eects (Wolfers and Zilinsky, 2015). Burda et al (2015) analyse empirical
measures of shirking and argue that the data are consistent with a model in
which "workers are paid eciency wages to refrain from loang on the job."
Groshen and Krueger (1990) and Rebitzer (2005) nd an inverse relationship
between wages and monitoring costs. Capelli and Chauvin (1991) and Reich
et al (2003) nd that rms take less disciplinary action against workers in
workplaces where relative wages are higher. Pfeifer (2010) and Zhang et al
(2013) nd that absenteeism is inversely related to wages. Malcomson and
Mavroeidis (2010) estimate aggregate wage equations on U.S time series data
and argue that their estimates are consistent with the shirking model. The
potential of a shirking mechanism in explaining the unemployment volatility
puzzle has been raised previously in the literature, for example by Rogerson
and Shimer (2010). Costain and Jansen (2009) develop a model with a shirking
mechanism but, in contrast to our approach, assume that wages are determined
through bargaining. They nd that this model does not help address the
unemployment volatility puzzle. Uhlig and Xu (1996) assess the ability of a
dierent type of eciency wage model1 to explain large cyclical movements in
unemployment using a real business cycle model without search frictions2. A
related strand of the literature (e.g. Danthine and Donaldson,1990 and Danthine
and Kurmann, 2010) incorporates eciency wage eects into DSGE models but
does not investigate the unemployment volatility puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We outline our model
in section 2). We discuss calibration and present our results in Section 3). We
analyse the impact of wage bargaining on our results in section 4); in section
5), we discuss the underlying causes of unemployment volatility and relate our
analysis to the fundamental suplus of Ljungqvist and Sargent, (2017). We
discuss the policy implications of our model in Section 6). Finally, section 7)
sumarises our work and raises issues for subsequent research.
1They assume that eort is a continuous function of the wage, similar to Solow (1979).
2Poeschel (2010) uses a model with shirking and wage posting to analyse the "Diamond
Paradox" (Diamond, 1971); his model diers from ours in several respacts, including the




There is a continuum of identical workers on the unit interval. In period t
a worker is in one of three states, employed and not shirking, employed and
shirking or unemployed. All employed workers suer a disutility3 of χ; workers
who do not shirk incur additional disutility of e. The value function for a worker
who is employed and not shirking is
Lt = wt − χ− e+
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τt)Mt+1 + τtUt+1] (1)
where Mt = max(Lt, St) and S is the value function for a worker who is
employed and shirking. This worker earns (and consumes) real wage wt and
experiences disutility of working4 of χ+ e. The job match dissolves at the end
of the period with exogenous but time-varying probability τt. We assume that
the separation rate is stochastic: τt = τe






t is distributed as N(0, σ
2
τ ). Although the worker does
not currently shirk, they may choose to do so in the next period, if the job
match survives. The value function for a worker who is employed and shirking
is
St = wt − χ+
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τt − d)Mt+1 + (τt + d)Ut+1] (2)
where the worker is detected as shirking and red with exogenous probability
d. Compared to a non-shirker, this worker incurs less disutility while at work
but has a higher probability of becoming unemployed. The value function for




Et[ftMt+1 + (1− ft)Ut+1] (3)
where b denotes real unemployment benets. If unemployed, an individual nds
a job and is employed in the next period with endogenous probability ft.
The worker will choose not to shirk if and only if Lt ≥ St. This implies the
No-Shirking Constraint




If the utility premium of workers who are employed and not shirking over
unemployed workers does not satisfy this condition, the utility benet from
shirking exceeds the risk-weighted cost from a higher likelihood of becoming
unemployed.
3Following Hall (2005), this might equivalently be modeled as the utility of leisure enjoyed
only by the unemployed.
4Our approach diers slightly from Burda et al (2015), who assign a utility benet to




There is a continuum of identical rms on the unit interval. Each rm can hire
up to one worker and a rm with an employed and non-shirking worker produces
an amount yt, where yt = e






and ηst is distributed as N(0, σ
2
s). Output is zero if the worker shirks. The value
function of a lled job with a non-shirking worker is
Jt = yt − wt +
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τt)Ht+1 + τtVt+1] (5)
where V is the value function of a vacancy, H = J if the worker chooses not
to shirk and H = F otherwise. F is the value function of a lled job with a
shirking worker, given by
Ft = −wt +
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τt − d)Ht+1 + (τt + d)Vt+1] (6)
The value function for a vacant job is
Vt = −γ +
1
1 + r
Et[qt+1Ht+1 + (1− qt+1)Vt+1] (7)
Firms must pay a real cost of γ to post a vacancy. Vacancies are then lled at
the start of the next period with probability q. We follow the timing convention
of Gertler et al (2009) and assume that new job matches become productive
immediately if the worker chooses not to shirk.
We assume free entry of rms, so Vt = 0. This implies that the value function
for vacancies simplies to













yt = wt + λt (10)
where λt = γ[(1 + r)
1
qt
− (1− τt)Et 1qt+1 ] is the real cost of hiring a worker.
2.3 The Labour Market
The labour market is characterised by search frictions. Aggregate hiring is






where h is the number of workers hired, u is the unemployment rate and v is the
vacancy rate. m and α are parameters characterising the matching function.






















In our baseline model, the rm chooses the wage. We will analyse wage bargaining
in Section 4) below. The rm will choose the lowest wage compatible with no
shirking, so Lt = St and Ht = Jt. From (4) the wage is determined by




Combining (1) and (3) to give
Lt − Ut = wt − e− b− χ+
1
1 + r
(1− τt − ft)Et(Lt+1 − Ut+1) (17)
and using (16), the wage is
wt = b+ χ+ e+
e
d
(r + τt + ft) (18)
This generalises the wage equation derived by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) to
account for search frictions.
3 Simulation Results
3.1 Calibration Strategy
In calibration, where possible, we follow earlier studies. Thus all parameters,
except those specic to the shirking mechanism, are calibrated using values
taken from the literature. The remaining parameters, d and e, are chosen
so that our model matches the average values of the unemployment rate and
labour market tightness in US data. We simulate our model using stochastic
processes for productivity and job separation shocks that match those observed
in the data. We then compare simulated volatilities for the unemployment rate,
vacancies, labour market tightness and the rate at which unemployed workers
nd a job with the data based measures presented in Shimer (2005)5.
5There are two approaches to simulation in the literature. In the rst (used by, among
others, Shimer, 2005 and Hall, 2005), productivity can take a number of discrete values, where
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3.2 Calibrated Parameter Values
We normalize a time period to be one quarter. Our calibrated parameter values
are outlined in Table 1). The discount rate is set as r = 1%. The average job
separation rate is τ = 0.1, following Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005); this implies
that on average 3.3% of employed workers exit employment every month6. The
cost of posting a vacancy is set as γ = 0.213, following Shimer (2005)7. Real
unemployment benets are set as b = 0.4. This is the same value as Shimer
(2005)8. The disutility of labour is assumed to be χ = 0.43. This is the value of
leisure estimated by Hall (2006). For the matching function, we follow Pissarides
(2009) and assume m = 2.19 and follow Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) by
assuming α = 0.5.
Table 1 Values of Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
τ Separation Rate 0.1
r Risk-Free Interest Rate 0.01
y Labour productivity 1
b Unemployment Benet 0.4
χ Disutility of Working 0.43
γ Vacancy Cost 0.213
m Matching Coecient 2.1
α Matching Elasticity 0.5
d Detection Rate 0.94
e Disutility of Eort 0.06
For the processes driving productivity and job separations shocks, we assume
ρs = 0.733 and ρτ = 0.875 for the autoregressive component and σs = 0.05
and στ = 0.01 for the volatilities of the underlying shocks. These values
generate shocks that match the autocorrelations and standard deviations of
labour productivity and job separation in U.S data for 1951-2003 reported in
transition between productivity values is described by a Markov process. The model is solved
for each simulated value of productivity. In the second (used by, among others, Rogerson
and Shimer, 2010, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2013 and Gertler et al, 2015), the model
is linearised around the steady-state and then simulated. In this paper, we follow the second
approach.
6In the literature, monthly values of τ vary between 0.03 (Hall and Milgrom, 2008) and
0.036 (Pissarides, 2009).
7There is a wide range of alternative calibrated values for γ in the literature. Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) use a weekly vacancy cost of 0.584. Hall (2005) assumes a monthly cost
of 0.986 while Pissarides (2009) assumes 0.420. Our use of a relatively small vacancy posting
cost gives rms a greater incentive to post vacancies; our nding of a low rate of vacancy
setting, and therefore a high vacancy lling rate, is therefore noteworthy.
8In the literature, values of b vary between 0.4 (Shimer, 2005) and 0.955 (Hagedorn and
Mankovskii 2008).
9Pissarides (2009) sets m = 0.7 in his monthly based calibration. The quarterly equivalent
of this is m = 2.1.
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Shimer (2005)10.
There are no previous calibrations of parameters comparable to e and d in
the literature. We solve the model comprising (10)-(15) and (18) in steady-
state, together with the condition fu = τ(1− u), using the parameter values in
Table 1). We select values of e and d to hit two calibration targets: an average
unemployment rate of u = 0.058, the average US unemployment rate from 1955
to 2003; and an average value for labour market tightness of θ = 0.5; this value
was used by Hall and Milgrom (2008) based on JOLTS data11. This results in
d = 0.94 and e = 0.0612. With these calibrated parameter values, we obtain
steady-state values of u = 0.064 and θ = 0.491, close to the targeted values. We
also nd a monthly average job nding rate of f = 0.492. This is close to the
value of f = 0.517 reported by Hall and Milgrom (2008)13. Thus our model also
provides a good t to this non-targeted variable. Dividing the simulated job
nding rate by the simulated value of θ, we obtain the implied average vacancy
lling rate in the model as q = 0.986. As discussed above, the high rate of
vacancy lling implies that variations in the number of vacancies posted leads
to large variations in unemployment.
Table 2 Values of Endogenous Variables for Calibration
Parameter Interpretation U.S Data This Paper
u Unemployment Rate 0.058 0.064
θ Labour Market Tightness 0.500 0.491
f Job Finding Rate 0.517 0.492
Source: Unemployment Rate: BLS data, 1955Q1-2003Q4; Labour Market Tightness:
JOLTS data, see Hall and Milgrom (2008); Job Finding Rate: JOLTS data, see Hall
and Milgrom (2008)
Using our calibrated parameters values and the value of f in Table 2) we
obtain w = 0.99 from the wage equation in (18). Thus the relatively small
friction from shirking eects implied by our values of e and d implies a low
10The volatlities of y and s are 0.020 and 0.075 respectively, while their auotcorrelations
are 0.878 and 0.733. These are the same as the corresponding values in Shimer (2005).
11Labour market tightness is hard to calibrate (Elsby et al, 2013). Shimer (2005) assumes
that θ = 1 in steady-state and uses this assumption to derive a measure of vacancy costs.
12Combining (10) and (18) in steady-state, the rm's optimality condition is
1− (r + τ)
γ
m
θα = b+ χ+ e+
e
d
(r + τ +mθ1−α)
Substituting the other parameter values from Table 1) and the target value of θ from Table
2), this can be written as




The solution to this requires a small value of e and a large value of d.
13Hall and Milgrom (2008) report that a daily job nding rate of 2.4%. The monthly
equivalent of this is 0.517.
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level of prot for rms. The implications of this will be explored in section 3.4)
below.
3.3 Volatilities
Column (i) of Table 3) shows the observed volatilities of the unemployment
rate, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job nding rate in US data
reported in Shimer (2005); column (ii) shows the simulated volatilities from
our model; columns (iii) and (iv) show, for comparison, the simulation results
reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and Shimer (2005). The volatility
of unemployment in the data is 0.190; in our simulations it is 0.213. The
volatilities of vacancies, labour market tightness and the job nding rate in
the data are 0.202, 0.382 and 0.118 respectively; the corresponding simulated
volatilities are 0.181, 0.373 and 0.186. It is thus clear that our model is able
to match the observed volatilities in the data well14, much better than the
simulations of the standard search frictions model reported in Shimer (2005)
and better than the results in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)15
Table 3 Volatilities of Key Labour Market Variables
U.S Data This Paper H&M DMP
u 0.190 0.213 0.145 0.031
v 0.202 0.181 0.169 0.011
θ 0.382 0.373 0.292 0.037
f 0.118 0.186  0.014
Note: column (i) is from Shimer (2005); column (iii) is taken from Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) and column (iv) is taken from Shimer (2005)
The simulated job nding rate is more volatile than the data indicates.
Therefore the model places too much emphasis on job creation, and too little
emphasis on job destruction, in explaining business cycle movements in labour
14Similar results are obtained if we supress separations shocks. This is line with the
literature, which nds that these shocks have little role in explaining cyclical movements
in key labour market variables
15Comparison with the volatilities reported by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is
complicated by the fact that they use a less volatile (and less autocorrelated) measure of
productivity than Shimer (2005). In particular, they follow Shimer (2005) in using a Hodrick-
Prescott lter, but use a much smaller smoothing parameter; a feature that lowers the
simulated labour market volatilities in their model. The ratio of their simulated unemployment
volatility to the volatility of productivity they use is 11.2. This ratio is 9.5 in our simulations.
This compares to empirical ratios of 9.5 and 9.6 reported by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) respectively.
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market variables16. Nonetheless, the over-prediction of this volatility on our
model is much smaller than the under-prediction in the standard search frictions
model.
3.4 Autocorrelations and Correlations
Table 4) presents the autocorrelations of key labour market variables. Column
(i) shows the observed autocorrelations of the unemployment rate, vacancies,
labour market tightness and the job nding rate in US data reported in Shimer
(2005); column (ii) shows the simulated autocorrelations from our model; columns
(iii)-(iv) show, for comparison, the simulation results reported by Shimer (2005)
and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Our model is better able to match the
autocorrelation of vacancies observed in the data. Shimer (2005) reports an
autocorrelation of 0.291 for vacancies and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) report
0.575. The autocorrelation of vacancies in our model is 0.877, closer than
alternative models to the observed value. Our model is able to match the high
persistence of vacancies in the data because the low rate of prot in our model
makes vacancy creation highly sensitive to output and thus the persistence of
vacancies matches the high rate of persistence of output.
Table 4 Autocorrelation of Key Labour Market Variables
U.S Data This Paper H&M DMP
u 0.936 0.814 0.830 0.933
v 0.940 0.877 0.575 0.291
θ 0.941 0.853 0.751 0.878
f 0.908 0.853  0.878
Note: column (i) is from Shimer (2005); column (iv) is taken from Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) and column (v) is taken from Shimer (2005)
Table 5) presents the correlations between unemployment, vacancies, labour
market tightness and the job nding rate obtained from simulations of our
model and compares these to correlations in US data and to those reported
by Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Our model produces
similar correlations to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and delivers a relatively
close match to the data. For example, Shimer (2005) reports a correlation
between unemployment and vacancies of -0.427, compared to -0.894 in the data.
In our model, this correlation is -0.794, similar to the value of -0.724 reported
by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). This relatively high correlation reects the
high vacancy lling rate in our model, which implies that variations in vacancies
lead to similar variations in unemployment.
16Exogenous job separations have little eect on labour market tightness. Therefore highly
volatile labour market tightness requires large volatility in job creation. Given the relatively
low levels of vacancies in the model, this create the excess volatility in the job nding rate
documented in Table 3).
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Table 5 Correlations of Key Labour Market Variables
u v θ f
U.S Data u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949
This Paper u 1 -0.794 -0.956 -0.956
Shimer (2005) u 1 -0.427 -0.964 -0.964
H&M (2008) u 1 -0.724 -0.916 
US Data v  1 0.975 0.897
This Paper v  1 0.938 0.938
Shimer (2005) v  1 0.650 0.650
H&M (2008) v  1 0.940 
U.S Data θ   1 0.948
This Paper θ   1 1
Shimer (2005) θ   1 1
H&M (2008) θ   1 
4 Wage Bargaining
The baseline model analysed above follows the literature on the shirking model
by assuming wage posting. As a result, our model diers from the standard
search frictions model by including shirking eects and wage posting. In this
section, we assess whether wage posting is essential to our results by analysing
the eects of wage bargaining. We conclude that wage posting is not essential.
Two main types of wage bargaining are popular in the search frictions literature.
Early contributions generally assume Nash Bargaining. In an inuential contribution,
Hall and Milgrom (2008) change the wage bargaining protocol from Nash bargaining
to an alternating oer credible bargaining set-up. We consider each in turn.
4.1 Nash Wage Bargaining With Shirking
This case has been analysed by Costain and Jansen (2010), who argue that a
shirking model with Nash wage bargaining cannot generate a large volatility of
unemployment. To see why in the context of our model, we assume that the
wage is chosen to maximise
(Lt − Ut)φJ1−φ (19)
where φ is the worker's relative bargaining power, subject to the no shirking
constraint. This implies that wages are determined by the condition




where St = Jt + Lt − Ut is the surplus from a job match. In our calibrations,
(1+r)e
d is equivalent to 6.4% of output while the average surplus from a job match
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is 55.1% of output. Therefore, wages will be determined by Nash bargaining,
unless the bargaining power of workers is very small. Assuming that the no-
shirking constraint does not bind, the Nash bargaining solution for the wage in
our model is (e.g. Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007)
wt = φ(yt + γθt) + (1− φ)(b+ χ+ e) (21)
The wage in (21) is substantially more volatile than (18), due to the high
volatility of labour market tightness. The volatility of the wage implies that
a shirking model with Nash wage bargaining cannot generate a large volatility
of unemployment.
4.2 Credible Wage Bargaining With Shirking
In this section, we argue that a shirking model with credible wage bargaining
can generate a large volatility of unemployment. We use the simplied form of
the credible wage bargain of Hall and Milgron (2008) proposed by Boitier and
Lepetit (2018). Each time interval is divided into a sequence of sub-periods.
In the rst sub-period, rms make a wage oer to the worker. If the oer is
accepted, the game ends. If the oer is rejected, the game goes on to the next
sub-period when the worker makes a counter-oer to the rm. During this time
interval, the rm incurs a ow cost of γ while the worker receives ow benets b.
Negotiations can breakdown with probability δ. In this case, the worker gets U
and the rm gets the value of an open vacancy: nothing. Otherwise, the game
continues to the next sub-period.
The surplus from a job match is divided between the worker and the rm
using the sharing rule (Hall and Milgron, 2008, Boitier and Lepetit, 2018)







Substituting the value functions outlined above into this gives
2wt = yt + b+χ+ e+
(r + τ)(b+ γ)






(1 + r)(r + δ)
EtUt+1 (23)
We follow Boitier and Lepetit (2018) and assume δ = τ , so the probability of
wage negotiations breaking down is the same as the probability that a job match
dissolves. This simplies the wage equation to






This extends the analysis of credible bargaining to a model with shirking eects.
In order to assess whether a shirking model with credible wage bargaining
can generate a large volatility of unemployment, we simulate our model in this
case17. Our results are shown in column (ii) of Table 6). The volatility of
17We retain our values for e and d for comparability with the results reported in Table 3).
In order to hit our calibration targets for u and θ, we use b = 0.24 and χ = 0.23.
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unemployment is 0.121, the volatility of vacancies is 0.151 and the volatility
of labour market tightness is 0.269. These values are somewhat lower than
those for the model with wage posting; they are similar to corresponding results
in Hagedorn and Manoskvii (2008) and in line with Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Table 6) also shows the key autocorrelations and correlations from our simulated
model with credible bargaining; they are similar to those from our baseline
model with wage posting; in particular, the autocorrelation of vacancies and
the correlation between unemployment and vacancies are again a much closer
match to the data than with the standard DMP model. To illustrate our results,
the left hand panel of Figure 1) compares the impulse response functions for
unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness in this model with those
from the baseline model. The impulse responses are quite similar. These results
show that extending our model to incorporate credible bargaining does not aect
our nding that a search frictions model with shirking eects is able to generate
a large volatility of unemployment.
5 Explaining the Volatility Results
5.1 Solutions to the volatility puzzle
Since unemployment, vacancies and the job-nding rate can be expressed as
functions of labour market tightness (eg Shimer, 2005), the volatility of labour
market tightness relative to the volatility of productivity shocks is at the core
of the unemployment volatility puzzle. In steady-state, this relative volatility
equals the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to output (Mortensen
and Nagypal, 2007). This elasticity has therefore become central to the debate
on the volatility puzzle.
In this debate, emphasis is placed on the elasticity of wages with respect
to output (stressed by Shimer, 2005, in his explanation of why the canonical
search frictions model failed to match the data, also see Hall, 2005, and Hall
and Milgrom, 2008) and on the rate of prot (eg Mortensen and Nagypal, 2007,
and Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). To analyse the role of these factors, we
can express the rm's optimality condition in steady-state as
y = w + λ (25)
where λ = γ(r+τ)q . This implies
εy,θ = (1− π)εw,θ + πελ,θ (26)
where εy,θ εw,θ and ελ,θ are respectively the elasticities of output, wages and
hiring costs with respect to labour market tightness and π = y−wy is the rate of
prot. Using (14) and the denition of λ, ελ,θ = α. Since εw,θ = εw,yεy,θ, (26)
can be written as







Equation (28) shows how the factors highlighted in the existing literature, the
elasticity of wages with respect to output and the rate of prot, interact to
determine the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to output. We
note that this elasticity is larger when wages are less responsive to output and
when the rate of prot is smaller18. We also note that the wage elasticity
has a larger impact if the rate of prot is small; this supports Hagedorn and
Manovskii's assertion that the wage elasticity only matters relative to the rate
of prot.
5.2 Volatility in the shirking model












∂θ ). Using (14), this
implies










(1− α) edf + απ
(30)
Using our parameter values and the average values of f from Table 2), the
elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to the productivity shock is
17.89. This is close to the ratio of the volatility of labour market tightness to
the volatility of productivity shocks in Table 2).
In our model, productivity shocks are transmitted to labour market
tightness through their impact on wages and on prots (the rst term in the
denominator of (30) contains the impact of productivity on wages, while the
second term in the denominator contains the impact of productivity on prots).
Equation (30) shows that our model is able to generate a large volatility of
labour market tightness because of a small value of ed and a small rate of prot.
This latter point is consistent with arguments in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
that a large volatility of labour market tightness requires a low rate of prot.
Low prots induce rms to put relatively few resources into recruiting, leading
to a low level of labour market tightness and a high vacancy lling rate. This
in turn implies that variations in vacancies in response to productivity shocks
are transmitted strongly into variations in unemployment
Using






with our calibrated parameters values, we obtain εw,y = 0.9. This is close to











< 0, (if εw,y < 1).
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to output is not central to the ability of our model to generate large volatilities
of unemployment and output.
5.3 Volatility in the standard model
The comparison with the standard search frictions model is useful here. The
wage implied by Nash bargainining in that model is (e.g. Mortensen and











(εy,θ + γθ) (33)












(1−φ) (1− α)γθ + α(1− b− χ)
(35)
Using the calibrated parameters in Table 1) and following Shimer (2005) in
assuming φ = 0.72, the elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to
the productivity shock is 4.48; if we follow most of the existing literature and
assume φ = 0.5, the elasticity is 1.74. Both values are considerably smaller
than the volatility observed in the data. As noted by Hagedorn and Makovskii
(2008), the standard search frictions model can only match empirical volatilities
by making the assumptions that workers have very little bargaining power and
that the value of leisure is large. The impact of these assumptions is clear from
(35). Low bargaining power of workers makes the rst term in the denominator
small while high value of leisure reduces the size of the second term19.
5.4 Volatility in the credible bargaining model
As discussed above, one prominent response to the volatility puzzle is credible
wage bargaining (eg Hall and Milgrom, 2008). The strategic wage bargain
switches the bargainers' threat point from terminating the bargain to extending
the bargain. This switch implies that the cost of delay in wage negotiations
replaces the worker's outside option as a driving force in wage formation. Assuming
a large xed cost of delay reduces the wage elasticity and so delivers a large
19Amaral et al (2016) raise concerns about the parameterisation of Hagedorn and Makovskii
(2008), arguing that their results rely on a small elasticity of wages, contrary to evidence
including Pissarides (2009).
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elasticity of labour market tightness with respect to output. The model might
be criticised both for the assumption that the cost of delay is large (Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2017) and for the assumption that this cost is acyclical (if the
cost of delay to the rm is pro-cyclical, reecting lost output, then the threat
point becomes pro-cyclical and so the resulting wage becomes more sensitive to
output).
5.5 The fundamental surplus
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) argue that all proposed solutions to the unemployment
volatility puzzle require a small value for the "fundamental surplus", the "upper
bound on the fraction of a job's output that the invisible hand can allocate
to vacancy creation"; this is equivalent to the lowest value of the wage that
is consistent with the no-shirking constraint. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017)










where ξ is the fundamental surplus and y−ξy is the fundamental surplus share.
In our model, the no-shirking constraint gives the lowest wage that is consistent
with positive output, so ξ = w and so the fundamental surplus share is simply
the rate of prot. We can show that Γ = (r+τ)γθα(r+τ)γ+(1−α) ed fq
. As with (30),
the low rate of prot in our model generates a large volatility of labour market
tightness. In the standard search frictions model, the fundamental surplus is
ξ = b + χ, as this is the lowest value of the wage that is consistent with non-
zero output. In this case, Γ = (r+τ)+φfα(r+τ)+φf . The inability of the standard search
frictions model to address the volatility puzzle is reected in the relatively small
values of Γ and ξ obtained by Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) using standard
calibrations. The value of yy−ξ is only large enough to generate substantial
volatility in θ when the value of b+χ is assumed to be large, following Hagedorn
and Makovskii (2008). In the case of the strategic bargaining model of Hall and
Milgrom (2008) (see also Christiano et al, 2016), the fundamental surplus is
ξ = b + χ + (1−τ)1+r γ, where γ is the xed cost of delay incurred by the rm; in
this case, Γ = 1α . Ljungqvist and Sargent (2017) argue that a large cost of delay
is required to generate a large volatility of labour market tightness.
6 Policy Implications
In this section, we extend our model to incorporate the eects of policy. We
argue that our main results continue to hold in these extensions of our model.
We also argue that our model has novel and interesting policy implications.
Following chapter 9 of Pissarides (2000), we consider income taxes and subsidies
on hiring and taxes on ring workers. We also consider the issue of transparency
over worker eort. We follow the literature in focusing on the impact of policy
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on wages, as this is critical for the analysis of the impact of policy on labour
market dynamics.
6.1 Income Taxes
Following Pissarides (2000), consider the income tax function,
T (wt) = ζwt − (1− ζ)ϕ (37)
where ζ is the rate of income tax and ϕ is a tax subsidy. Introducing income
taxes alters the value function for a worker, which becomes
Lt = wt − T (wt)− χ− e+
1
1 + r
Et[(1− τt)Mt+1 + τtUt+1] (38)







(r + τt + ft)− ϕ] (39)
Comparing this with the wage equation in (18), we note that the income tax
increases the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity as the multiplier
1
1−ζ amplies the impact of the job nding rate on wages. This is a novel
nding as the existing literature, based on Nash bargaining, has argued that
the marginal tax rate has no direct impact on wage cyclicality20. This is an
important nding since unemployment variability is a concern for policymakers.
Our analysis suggests that an income tax has potential to alleviate unemployment
volatility as it increases wage cyclicality21. To simulate this extension of our
model, we assume a tax rate of 20%. We adjust the calibration of e to ensure
that our calibration targets are met. Our results are shown in column (iii) of
Table 6). The volatilities, autocorrelations and correlations of unemployment,
vacancies and labour market tightness are similar to the baseline model.
6.2 A Hiring Subsidy
To analyse a hiring subsidy, we assume rms receive a subsidy Ψ when a worker
is hired. Then the value of a vacancy to the rm in the case where workers
never shirk becomes
Vt = −γ +
1
1 + r






20See for example, equations (9.14) and (9.15) in Pissarides (2000).
21this analysis also implies that an income tax does not necessarily increase the pre-tax
wage. Whether or not the wage paid by the rm rises depends on the balance between the
marginal tax rate (ζ) and the tax subsidy (ϕ). This nding is in line with Pissarides (2000).
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Combining this with (5) gives




The wage is given by (18), so
yt = b+ χ+ e+
e
d




We can draw three implications about an increased hiring subsidy. First,
there is only a small impact on the wage, as the subsidy only aects the wage
through the job nding rate. Second, (43) shows that an increased subsidy
leads to an increase in λ and hence a reduction in unemployment. Third, the
increase in λ leads to a reduction in the volatility of unemployment.This is
consistent with the argument of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008): the subsidy
increases λ and so increases the amount rms spend on recruitment; this implies
that a productivity shock leads to a smaller percentage change in the resources
dedicated to vacancy creation and so the volatility of unemployment is lower.
To simulate this extension of our model, we assume a hiring subsidy equivalent
to 5% of output. We again adjust the calibration of e to ensure that our
calibration targets are met. As column (iv) of Table 6) shows, the volatilities,
autocorrelations and correlationsof unemployment, vacancies and labour market
tightness are similar to the baseline model.
6.3 A Payroll Tax
To analyse the eects of a payroll tax, we assume that rms must pay a payroll
tax of τwwt. The value of a lled job to the rm becomes




Combining this with (8) in the case where workers never shirk gives
yt = wt(1 + τ
w) + λt (45)
The wage is again given by (18), so
yt = (1 + τ
w){b+ χ+ e+ e
d
(r + τt + ft)}+ λt (46)
This analysis shows that a payroll tax has the opposite eect to a hiring subsidy.
The impact on the wage is again small. From (46), the tax leads to a reduction
in λ and hence an increase in unemployment. This implies an increase in the
volatility of unemployment, through the arguments of Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008).
To simulate this version of our model, we assume a payroll tax of 5%. Our
results are in column (v) of Table 6); the volatilities, autocorrelations and
correlations of unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness are again
similar to the baseline model.
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Table 6) Key Statistics From Alternative Models
(i) Baseline (ii) Credible Bargaining (iii) Income Tax (iv) Hiring Subsidies (v) Payroll Tax
σu 0.213 0.121 0.194 0.209 0.251
σv 0.181 0.151 0.149 0.175 0.234
σθ 0.373 0.269 0.321 0.363 0.471
ρu 0.814 0.938 0.799 0.811 0.835
ρv 0.877 0.817 0.876 0.877 0.879
ρθ 0.853 0.878 0.842 0.851 0.864
ρu,v -0.794 -0.953 -0.748 -0.786 -0.856
ρu,θ -0.956 -0.985 -0.952 -0.955 -0.965
ρv,θ 0.934 0.991 0.912 0.934 0.961
To illustrate our results from these extensions of our baseline model, the right
hand panel of Figure 1) shows the impulse response functions for unemployment,
vacancies and labour market tightness in the models for the three cases considered
in this section. The impulse responses are quite similar to each other and with
the impulse responses for the baseline model, shown in the left hand panel.
In summary, this analysis has shown that our model has distinctive policy
implications. Income taxes aect the volatility of wages, and hence the volatility
of unemployment, contrary to the prediction of the Search Frictions model. An
increased hiring subsidy or a payroll tax cut leads to reduced and less volatile
unemployment. These latter eects are smaller than in the Search Frictions
model. In that model, an increased hiring subsidy or a reduction in payroll
taxes would lead to larger changes in the bargained wage than in our model, if
the worker has a relatively large bargaining power. We would therefore expect
a stronger decline in unemployment and its volatility. The predictions from our
model seem more credible, since it can match the volatility of unemployment,
unlike the Search Frictions model.
6.4 The Detection Rate and Transparency
One novelty of our model is that it highlights the impact of transparency around
worker eort on labour market dynamics. If worker eort could be observed
perfectly and without cost, then wages and unemployment would become less
volatile. This implies that changes in the transparency of worker eort that
arise from changes in technology and working practices will have consequences
for the volatility of wages and unemployment across the business cycle. These
issues therefore have important policy implications.
7 Conclusions
This paper has developed a modied version of the standard search frictions
model developed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and
Pissarides (2000) that introduces a shirking mechanism. Simulations of the
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Figure 1: Simulated Impulse Response Functions for Various Models
Notes: The Left Hand panel of this gure plots the impulse response function of
unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness for the baseline model (blue) and the
model with credible bargaining (red). The right hand panel depicts the the impulse response
function of unemployment, vacancies and labour market tightness for the extension of the
model to include income taxes (blue), hiring subsidies (red) and payroll taxes (black)
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model show a close match to the observed volatilities, correlations and autocorrelations
of unemployment, vacancies, labour market tightness and the job nding rate
in US data. The model is better able to match key features of the data
than prominent alternative models that have been proposed in response to the
unemployment volatility puzzle. The key mechanism underlying these results is
that even a small shirking eect leads to a small rate of proft. This leads to a low
rate of vacancy creation which, since vacancies are low relative to the number
of unemployed workers, implies a high vacancy lling rate. This in turn implies
that hiring is highly sensitive to the number of vacancies; as a consequence,
variations in job vacancies in response to shocks lead to large variations in
unemployment. Since a low rate of prot also implies that vacancies are highly
sensitive to ouput, unemployment is highly sensitive to productivity shocks.
Our analysis suggests two broad conclusions about the modeling of the
labour market. First, the debate on unemployment volatility has largely been
conducted in the context of a highly stylised and unrealistic model of the labour
market: the standard search frictions model. The search for mechanisms that
can generate unemployment volatility has largely been conducted within the
context of this model. The results in this paper suggest that the causes of high
unemployment volatility may lie outside this restricted environment.
Second, our analysis illustrates the benets of incorporating insights from
the Behavioural Economics literature into Search Frictions models. This reslts
in models that are richer and provide better descriptions of actual labour market
behaviour but which also retain the rigorous analysis of the processes driving the
labour market that characterise the Search Frictions approach. For example,
we might investigate whether the ability to generate a large volatility of key
labour market variables is a generic property of behavioural models of worker
eort. This paper has argued that incorporating a shirking eect into a Search
Frictions model can generate a large volatility of unemployment and other labour
market variables. One might similarly extend models in which in which eort is
a continuous function of the wage rather than binary (Solow, 1979) and examine
whether these can also generate high levels of labour market volatility.
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